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ABSTRACT
Empirical evidence suggesting that a considerable amount of horizontal strategic interaction exists
amongst governments is important in light of recent devolutionary trends of many important public
programs. The empirical approach in these studies typically relies on estimating reaction functions
in a uni-dimensional policy framework, where a nonzero slope estimate is interpreted as evidence
in support of strategic interactions. While this framework is a useful representation within certain
contexts, it is potentially too restrictive; for example, in models of resource competition, localities
may use multiple instruments in their recruiting pursuits, leading to potential strategic interactions
across policy instruments. In this study, we first develop a simple theoretic construct that includes
resource competition in a world of three-dimensional policy choice. The model suggests that while
a zero-sloped reaction function may exist for any particular policy, this does not necessarily imply
the absence of strategic interactions. We examine the implications of the model empirically using
US state-level panel data over the period 1977-1994. The results suggest that important cross-policy
strategic interactions exist, lending support in favor of the multi-dimensional framework, and
indicate that uni-dimensional frameworks may present lower bound estimates of the degree of
strategic interaction.
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I.  Introduction 
  Throughout its history the United States has utilized a federal system to promote greater 
efficiency and innovation in government practice.  Federalism is endorsed because it provides 
freedom for states and localities to choose their optimal bundle of public goods and services.  
Indeed, this freedom of choice has allowed states and localities to take on the role of laboratories 
of democracy, whereby unique policies can be implemented on a much smaller scale than 
necessary at the federal level.  In describing the novel aspects associated with the New Deal, 
Franklin Roosevelt highlighted this advantage: “Practically all the things we’ve done in the 
federal government are like things Al Smith did as governor in New York.”
1   
While these and other advantages of federalism have been widely touted by supporters of 
local control over many important public programs, it is not clear that all levels of government 
have incentives to establish economically efficient policies.  For instance, Oates and Schwab 
(1988) and Wilson (1996) show in a second-best world in which initial distortions already are 
present that locally determined policies are likely to be suboptimal.  This potential suboptimality 
is highlighted in the “race to the bottom” literature, which suggests that competition for firms and 
jobs will cause localities to “race to the bottom” in their provisioning of public goods and services 
(e.g., Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wildasin, 1989).  In particular, a major fear is that upon 
one locality relaxing its environmental standards, other jurisdictions would follow, leading to a 
domino effect whereby local environmental quality is sacrificed ubiquitously.  This potential race to 
the bottom was one of the motivating factors behind the creation of the Environmental Protection 
Agency in 1968, which resulted in a dominating federal presence in environmental policy.   
                                                           
1 See Schlesinger (1960, p. 520). 
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Understanding whether such a dynamic process unfolds in practice is invaluable since 
budgetary difficulties around the world have led to a heavy reliance on local fiscal decisions.  The 
rich literature to date has taken a first step in this direction by examining horizontal interaction of 
public policies.
2  The general intuition underlying the theoretical constructs of these strategic 
interaction models is quite straightforward:  since local economies are spatially linked, under certain 
realistic assumptions governments may interact strategically when setting policies.  Although the 
various theoretical models and the accompanying empirical literature at times are motivated quite 
differently, the resulting empirical goals within the literature are composed quite similarly – 
estimate reaction functions in a uni-dimensional policy framework and test whether the slope is 
significantly different from zero.  A finding of a nonzero (zero) slope estimate is conjectured to 
be evidence that strategic interactions exist (do not exist) (see, e.g., Case et al., 1993; Besley and 
Case, 1995a; Murdoch et al., 1997; Brueckner, 1998; Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; 
Fredriksson and Millimet, 2002a; 2002b; Revelli, 2002).
3  
  While this particular framework is a useful representation within certain contexts, the 
possibility of reaching false inferences may not be trivial.  Consider the case of local competition 
for a new plant, where extravagant baskets of incentives are not unusual in the world of 
smokestack chasing:  in the 1993 Mercedes sports utility vehicle plant bidding war, Alabama 
out-dueled 34 other states with an incentive package that totaled $300 million, of which 
                                                           
2 For thoughtful reviews see Wilson (1996) and Brueckner (2003).  Brueckner (2003) splices the studies into two 
groups:  i) spillover models, which includes yardstick competition models, and ii) resource flow models.  
3 The present paper is related to the literature on welfare benefit competition (e.g., Figlio et al., 1999; Brueckner, 
2000a; and Saavedra, 2000), to the theoretical literature on tax competition (e.g., Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; 
Wilson, 1986; 1987; Wildasin, 1988; Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991; Edwards and Keen, 1996; and Brueckner 
2000b), and to the theoretical literature on capital competition using environmental policy (e.g., Oates and Schwab, 
1988; Markusen et al., 1995; and Ulph, 2000).  The only exceptions to the uni-dimensionality approach appear to be 
Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) who study tax rates and public expenditures in Belgian municipalities, as well as 
Besley and Rosen (1998), Hayashi and Boadway (2001), and Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001) who study the 
vertical relationship between national (federal) and local (state) government taxation. 
   4
infrastructure development, job training, tax concessions, and other perks were included.  Similar 
deals were struck in Tennessee, where the state offered an incentive package for a Nissan 
automobile manufacturing plant that totaled approximately $11,000 per created job; five years 
later in 1987 Tennessee offered Saturn a package more than double Nissan’s package in terms of 
dollars per created job:  $26,000 per job.  Both Nissan and Saturn gladly accepted the offers and 
chose the Volunteer state as their new homes.
4   
These anecdotes highlight the fact that competition may occur across several policy 
dimensions, and in particular tax-, environmental-, and infrastructure policies may be used 
simultaneously.  Accordingly, concluding from a zero-sloped reaction function for any specific 
policy that strategic policymaking is absent risks a Type II error.  For example, whereas 
California may not have the wherewithal to concede certain environmental requests, it may 
counteract competitors’ environmental concessions via tax breaks or promises of expanded 
infrastructure.  In this case, an empirical examination focusing on relative pollution control 
standards would indicate an orthogonal horizontal relationship between environmental policies 
and entirely miss the fact that lower effective tax rates are potentially inducing lower 
provisioning of other types of public goods and services.   
In this study, we revisit the issue of horizontal strategic policymaking by developing a 
simple theoretical model that includes multi-dimensional policies.  Motivated by the concerns of 
voters over environmental quality, public goods, and the attraction of mobile capital, states may 
act strategically when determining three interrelated policies: (i) state-level taxation, (ii) 
                                                           
4 This story along with several others can be found at:  http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/2817/govern.htm 
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infrastructure spending, and (iii) pollution control standards.
5  Via this extension, we are able to 
provide a much richer model of strategic policymaking as we are able to investigate both intra- 
and inter-policy strategic reaction functions.   
We test the empirical implications of the model by utilizing US state-level panel data 
over the period 1977-1994.  Our empirical results suggest that important own- and cross-policy 
interactions exist.  For example, states respond to higher levels of governmental expenditure 
levels in neighboring states by lowering their own pollution standards.  Furthermore, within 
policy types, we find positively sloped tax and expenditure reaction functions, consistent with 
previous efforts (e.g., Besley and Case, 1995a; Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001).  Overall, our 
results suggest that uni-dimensional frameworks may present lower bound estimates of the 
degree of strategic interaction. 
  The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 briefly describes the 
underlying theoretical construct.  Section 3 presents the empirical model and our data.  Section 4 
contains the empirical results.  Section 5 concludes. 
II.  The Model 
We seek to develop a simple model of multi-dimensional strategic interaction between n 
states (indexed by i, i = 1,…,n), building on models of capital competition discussed in Oates 
and Schwab (1988, 1991, 1996), Brueckner (2003), and Oates (2001).  The representative 
agent’s preferences in state i are given by  
),
~
; , , ( i i i i X P Q c U        ( 1 )    
                                                           
5 For discussions of the effect of public spending, see Duffy-Deno and Eberts (1991), Carlino and Voith (1992), 
Garcia-Milaand and McGuire (1992), Morrison and Schwartz (1996), Dalenberg and Partridge (1997), and Chandra 
and Thompson (2000).   
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where  i c  is consumption,  i Q  is the level of environmental quality,  i P  is the amount provided of 
a “pure” local public good, and  i X
~
 is a vector of state characteristics except income, which 
contribute to determining preferences. Utility is increasing and concave in ci and Pi, and 
decreasing and convex in Qi.  We make no assumptions about the cross-partials. 
Following Oates and Schwab (1988), we assume that each identical jurisdiction has firms 
producing a private good, Z, for the national and international markets with price equal to one.  
As in Fredriksson et al. (2002), production requires inputs of mobile capital, K, immobile labor, 
L, waste emissions, Ψ , and infrastructure, S.  The production technology of the consumption 
good exhibits constant returns to scale, is concave and increasing in all inputs, and twice 
continuously differentiable,  ) S , Ψ , , ( i i i i i L K F Z = , which can be rewritten as 
) , , ( i i i i i s k f L Z ψ = , where  i i i L K k / =  is the capital-labor ratio,  i i i L / Ψ = ψ , is the emissions-
labor ratio, and  i i i L S s / =  is the infrastructure-labor ratio.  Since the number of workers is 
fixed,  ψ  determines aggregate emissions for each state.  Environmental quality is simply a 
function of the emissions-labor ratio within a state,  ). ( i Q ψ  
The marginal products of capital, emissions, infrastructure spending, and labor equal 
, / k f ∂ ∂   , / ψ ∂ ∂ f   , / s f ∂ ∂  and  ) / / / ( s f s f k f k f ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ − ψ ψ , respectively, where 
, 0 /
2 2 < ∂ ∂ k f 0 /
2 2 < ∂ ∂ ψ f , 0 /
2 2 < ∂ ∂ s f . We assume  , 0 /
2 > ∂ ∂ ∂ ψ k f   = ∂ ∂ ∂ s k f /
2  
0 /
2 > ∂ ∂ ∂ k s f , and  0 /
2 = ∂ ∂ ∂ ψ s f .  
Each state government finances the provision of the “pure” public good and the 
infrastructure good by a capital tax ti is levied on the capital stock located within state i. 
Assuming prices of both the pure public good and the infrastructure good are equal to unity, the 
local government’s budget constraint equals  . i i i i S P t K + =   We assume that state i allocates a   7
share  i γ  of all local government revenues to the infrastructure good, such that  . i i i i t K S γ =   The 
remaining share is used for the pure public consumption good, such that  ) 1 ( i i i i t K P γ − = .  State 
i chooses  i t  and  . i γ  
The capital stock is perfectly mobile between states, but is available in a fixed supply 





i k n k
1
, where k  is the average capital-labor ratio nationally. 
Capital responds to changes in the environmental policy, the capital tax, and the infrastructure 
level, which affect its endogenous rate of return, r.  The rate of return on capital is equalized 
across jurisdictions, and the equilibrium condition for the capital stock is given by 
, / / r t s f t k f
i i i = − ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ γ      i = 1,…,n (2)   
where the capital stock’s indirect effect on output via the level of infrastructure spending 
depends on the capital tax,  . / i i i i t k s γ = ∂ ∂   It follows that the capital stock,  , i k  and the rate of 
return,  r, can be expressed as functions of all environmental policies, the capital tax, and 
infrastructure spending share levels, such that  
) , , , , , ( i i i i i i i t t H k − − − = γ γ ψ ψ ,       ( 3 )    
) , , ( γ ψ t G r = ,         ( 4 )    
where ψ , t, and γ  are the vectors of environmental policies, capital tax rates, and infrastructure 
spending share levels, respectively.  
Each individual supplies one unit of labor.  The wage equals the sum of the marginal 
product of labor plus the additional output arising from the increase in allowable emissions, 
ψ ψ ∂ ∂ / f i .  Hence, the wage rate is given by  . / / ) , , ( s f s k f k f s k w i i i i i ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ − = ψ   Assuming   8
equal ownership of capital, individual consumption is determined by the wage rate plus capital 
income,  , k r  i.e. the individual’s budget constraint is given by  . k r w c + =   
Given budget restrictions, preferences in (1) can now be restated as  
) ; , , , , , (
]
~
); 1 ( ) , , , , , ( ), ( , ) , , ( ) , ), , , , , , ( ( [
]
~
); 1 ( ), ( , ) , , ( [
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
X t t V
X t t t H L Q k t G s t t H w U
X t K Q k r s k w U
− − −
− − − − − − ≡ − +
= − +
γ γ ψ ψ
γ γ γ ψ ψ ψ γ ψ ψ γ γ ψ ψ
γ ψ ψ
     (5)  
where Xi represents all attributes in  i X
~
, as well as income.  From (5) it follows that the objective 
function of state i  depends on its own and other states’ environmental, capital tax, and 
infrastructure policies.  State i maximizes (5) by setting  , 0 = ∂ ∂ i V ψ   , 0 = ∂ ∂ i t V  and 
. 0 = ∂ ∂ i V γ   These first-order conditions implicitly define the equilibrium values of  i ψ ,  i t , and 
i γ  as functions of the values in neighboring states,  i − ψ ,  i t− , and  . i − γ   Applying the implicit 
function theorem to the first-order conditions, treating  i − ψ ,  i t− , and  i − γ  as parameters, yields the 
following set of reaction functions: 
, i i − ∂ ∂ ψ ψ   , i i t− ∂ ∂ ψ   , i i − ∂ ∂ γ ψ , i i t − ∂ ∂ ψ , i i t t − ∂ ∂   , i i t − ∂ ∂ γ , i i − ∂ ∂ ψ γ , i i t− ∂ ∂ γ , i i − ∂ ∂ γ γ  
    ( 6 )      
which can be shown to be ambiguous in sign due to the presence of ambiguous cross-partials.  
We assume stability and interior conditions are met.  With the exception of knife-edge cases and 
when no capital competition occurs between states, the vector of reaction functions can take 
either sign (see also Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001).  
The goal of our empirical analysis is to test if the reaction functions have slopes 
significantly different from zero.  As the positions of the reaction functions may depend on the   9
underlying characteristics of each jurisdiction, it is necessary to control for such state-specific 
attributes in the empirical work below.  However, our attention is focused on estimation of the 
slopes of the reaction functions, rather than on the relative positions of the reaction functions.  
III.  Empirical Specification 
To test whether horizontal strategic interaction occurs across policies, our empirical 
analysis proceeds by analyzing the temporal and spatial patterns of state-level pollution 
abatement compliance expenditures, tax rates, and infrastructure investment.
6  T o  b e g i n  t h e  
empirical inquiry, consider the “traditional” approach to estimating reaction functions in a uni-
dimensional framework: 
Yit = φ 48 ω ijtYjt + xitβ  + η it     i = 1…48; j ≠  i   (7)   
where Yit(jt) is a measure of policy choice in state i (j) at time t, ω ijt is the weight assigned to state 
j by state i at time t, φ  is the parameter of interest, as it represents the slope estimate of the 
reaction function,  xit is a vector of state characteristics, and η it = ut + α i + eit, where ut and α i are 
fixed time and state effects, and eit represents idiosyncratic shocks uncorrelated over time, but 
potentially correlated across states.   
To augment this approach and maintain consistency with our theoretical model, we 
assume an isomorphic weight vector and simply replace Yjt with a policy instrument vector Yjtp 
and φ  with a vector of parameters, φ p, where P indexes the three policy instruments mentioned 
above (taxes, infrastructure spending, and environmental stringency).  This regression approach 
is quite flexible; for example, rather than implicitly assuming orthogonal policies (e.g., 
restricting neighboring tax rates to influence only own tax rates (intra-policy interaction)), this 
                                                           
6 In the following discussion we assume that abatement expenditures are related to stringency of environmental 
policies.   
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approach allows, say, state j’s tax rates to influence state i’s pollution regulatory stringency 
(inter-policy interactions).   
If the spirit of competing for resources involves offering a basket of market incentives, 
then such trade-offs across the individual incentives seem likely; hence it makes sense that there 
is an inherent marginal rate of substitution across the various instruments.  Accordingly, we 
estimate the augmented (7) separately for each policy instrument.
7  A test for strategic interaction 
among states therefore requires testing for the statistical and economic significance of φ p.   
Before proceeding to a description of the data, two important issues in the estimation of 
the multi-dimensional strategic interaction model merit discussion.  First, in choosing weights, ω, 
we follow the procedures of Fredriksson and Millimet (2002a; 2002b) and use three 
straightforward methods.  The first approach, deemed Equal weights, assigns a weight of zero to 
non-contiguous states and equivalent weights to all contiguous states; hence jω ijtYjt becomes the 
mean of policies in neighboring states.  Our second and third approaches, denoted Income and 
Population weights, assign weights of zero to non-contiguous states, but weight each contiguous 
state by its per capita income level or population: ω ijt = Zjt/j∈ JiZjt, where Zjt is either population 
or income per capita and Ji is the set of states bordering state i.  These schemes explicitly allow 
temporal variability in the weights, whereas the Equal weights approach imposes a static weight.   
A second major estimation issue relates to the potential endogeneity of the policy vector 
of other states.  In the true spirit of reaction functions, states simultaneously choose their 
policies, potentially giving rise to concerns about the direction of causation implied in (7).  A 
further specification issue that arises in this framework is the influence of unobservable regional 
and national shocks that are correlated with the policy decisions of several states (i.e., spatial 
                                                           
7 In the actual estimation, the set of right-hand side control variables is identical for each policy instrument.  As a 
result, joint estimation of the system of policy measures is identical to estimation one equation at a time.   11
autocorrelation).  To circumvent these potential problems, we follow two distinct approaches.  
First, we instrument for neighboring policies via a two-stage least squares (TSLS) regression 
approach.  While other viable procedures are available (e.g., Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001), it is 
important to recall that instrumental variables (IV) estimation remains consistent in the presence 
of spatially correlated error terms (Kelejian and Prucha, 1997; Brueckner, 2001), and offers the 
advantage of computational ease in light of the multi-dimensional framework.  Within a test of 
strategic policymaking, this is critical since the presence of spatially correlated unobservables 
could lead one to conclude incorrectly that strategic behavior is evident.    Thus, following Figlio 
et al. (1999) and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002a; 2002b), we make use of (a subset of) the 
attributes included in xit for neighboring states as instruments (e.g., population, population 
density, age composition, and the degree of urbanization) and employ the same weighting 
scheme for the instruments as we do for neighboring policies.
8   
Several diagnostic tests are conducted to assess the reliability and efficiency of the TSLS 
estimates.  First, since the number of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous regressors, 
we present the results of Sargan overidentification tests for the validity of the instruments.   
Second, we show the results from Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) tests for exogeneity.  In 
addition, since it is well-known that TSLS estimates based on weak instruments are biased 
toward the OLS estimates (e.g., Bound et al., 1995), we conduct several further tests.  First, as 
argued in Bound et al. (1995) and Shea (1997), we compute the partial R
2s for the instruments in 
the first-stage regressions, as well as conduct F-tests for the joint significance of the instrument 
sets.  Second, we conduct the test proposed in Hall et al. (1996) for instrument relevance.  The 
                                                           
8 For example, we use a vector of average neighboring exogenous attributes, weighted equally (by income or 
population), as instruments for the vector of equally (income, population) weighted average policies in neighboring 
states. 
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test examines whether the smallest sample canonical correlation between the instrument set and 
the vector of endogenous variables is significantly different from zero.  Finally, we compute 
Stock and Staigner’s (1997) measure of the maximum squared bias of the TSLS estimates 
relative to the OLS estimates (Bmax in their notation; equation (3.6), p. 566). 
Our second approach to handling the endogeneity issues proceeds by replacing the 
contemporaneous vector of neighboring policies with its lagged counterpart (see, e.g., Smith, 
1997; Fredriksson and Millimet, 2002b).  This particular approach eliminates any concern related 
to reverse causation since policies enacted in state i today should have no direct implications for 
past policies enacted in neighboring states.  Moreover, this approach has the added benefit of 
flexibility in that it allows lags in strategic interaction, perhaps due to lags in the flow of 
information across states.  We allow for two distinct lag processes:  i) replace neighboring 
policies with their lagged values using two year lags and ii) replace neighboring policies with 
their lagged values using five year lags.   
Data Description 
A test for the presence of strategic policymaking in a multi-dimensional world requires 
data across several state policy items.  To maintain consistency with the spirit of our theoretical 
inquiry, we focus on three state policies.  Our first state-level policy relates to the level of 
taxation.  This particular variable, which is a form of tax effort, is from the Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and measures the extent to which a state utilizes its 
available tax bases.  It represents a state’s actual revenues divided by its estimated capacity to 
raise revenues based on a model tax code, multiplied by 100.  The national average is 100.  This 
variable has been used in a number of previous empirical efforts (e.g., List and Co, 2000; 
Fredriksson et al., 2002; Keller and Levinson, 2002) for other purposes.  Our second policy   13
variable measures governmental state expenditures and is defined as “total general 
expenditures.”
9  The data are reported annually by state in the Compendium of State Government 
Finances, and have been used in previous studies of gubernatorial electoral accountability 
(Besley and Case, 1995b).  Our third policy measure is the relative stringency of environmental 
policies across states.  The index, which is derived in Levinson (2001), measures environmental 
stringency at the state level as the ratio of actual pollution costs per dollar of output to predicted 
pollution costs per dollar of output based on the distribution of industries across states.  A value 
greater (less) than one indicates that industries in the state spend relatively more (less) per dollar 
of output on pollution abatement than identical industries located in other states.
10   
  Besides these major policy variables, we utilize several control variables in the estimation 
of the augmented (7).  In choosing our control variables, we were careful to follow the previous 
literature and include measures of economic conditions at the state-level, such as per capita 
income and the rate of unemployment, as well as demographic characteristics, such as age 
composition (as measured by percentage of young and elderly citizens).  Other controls measure 
the scale of the local economy, and include population and population density.  Finally, to 
provide a control for the heterogeneous populations across space, we include the percentage of 
urban residents.  These state-level data are obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
                                                           
9 Note that since the tax variable is not tax revenue, but rather tax effort, there is no issue of government 
expenditures and tax policy being perfectly co-linear even if states balance their budgets in each period.  States 
differ significantly in size, and there may be large economies of scale in the provision of public (consumption) 
goods.  Moreover, public good consumption is not assumed to attract capital.  Thus, the test of strategic interaction 
in the public expenditure dimension is implicitly a test of whether the funds are used for goods that raise the 
productivity of capital.  Also, given that we can observe S and not  i γ , since Si = i γ tiKi, controlling for t and K, 
variation in  i γ  maps into variation in Si.  Our empirical treatment therefore uses data for S, the level of infrastructure 
investment.   
10 The index of relative abatement expenditures has also been used in Millimet and Slottje (2002), Keller and 
Levinson (2002), Fredriksson et al. (2002), and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002a; 2002b). 
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(http://www.bea.doc.gov).  Descriptive information pertaining to each of the variables can be 
found in Table 1.
11   
IV.  Empirical Results 
  Tables 2 and 3 present the empirical results, with Table 2 displaying empirical estimates 
from the contemporaneous specifications and Table 3 containing estimates from the lagged 
specifications.  Before proceeding to a discussion of the results, several points should be 
emphasized.  First, estimated coefficients on the policy instrument regressors in Tables 2 and 3 
should be interpreted as elasticities since we model the regressand and policy regressors in 
natural logarithmic form.  Second, results from tests of joint significance of the parameters of 
interest presented in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that there is considerable evidence supporting the 
notion of strategic interaction between and within state-level policies across space.  Third, our 
instrument sets pass the Sargan overidentification test in every case, as well as the Hall et al. 
(1996) test for instrument relevance at the p < 0.01 level of significance.
12  Fourth, F-tests reject 
the null that the instruments are jointly insignificant in the first-stage regressions in every case at 
the p < 0.01 level of significance, and the partial R
2s tend to be quite high.
13  Fifth, the maximum 
squared bias of the TSLS estimates relative to the OLS estimates is always approximately 0.03, 
                                                           
11 Most importantly, there is considerable variation in the three policy measures within states over time.  For 
environmental policy, the average state experienced a 7% increase in its value of the stringency index from 1977 to 
1994, with a minimum of a 67% decrease and a maximum of a 163% increase.  States experienced an 8% increase 
on average in tax effort over the sample period, with a minimum of a 41% decrease and a maximum of a 48% 
increase.  Finally, the average state experienced a 71% increase in real government expenditures over the sample 
period, with a minimum of a 23% decrease and a maximum of a 173% increase. 
12 The minimum canonical correlation between the instrument set and vector of endogenous regressors is at least 
0.40 in every specification. 
13 In the models with environmental policy as the dependent variable, the F-tests are 5.28, 37.60, and 75.40 for the 
three first-stage equations (neighboring environmental policy, neighboring tax policy, and neighboring spending) 
using equal weights.  Shea’s (1997) partial R
2s are 0.02, 0.15, and 0.19, respectively.  The F-tests are 6.56, 24.79, 
and 74.25 (2.96, 24.65, and 78.44) for the three first-stage equations using income (population) weights; the partial 
R
2s are 0.03, 0.14, and 0.22 (0.00, 0.01, and 0.03), respectively.  In the models with tax and spending policy as the 
dependent variables, the F-tests are 5.84, 113.05, and 88.70 for the first-stage equations using equal weights.  Shea’s 
(1997) partial R
2s are 0.01, 0.05, and 0.07, respectively.  The F-tests are 5.57, 116.00, and 85.60 (8.36, 84.95, and   15
suggesting the reliability of the TSLS estimates.  Finally, the DWH tests consistently reject the 
null of exogeneity at the p < 0.01 level of significance. 
  In terms of the point estimates, the results suggest a fair amount of inter-policy spatial 
interaction within each of the three policy instruments.  For instance, empirical results in 
columns 1-3 of Table 2 suggest that neighboring spending levels influence the stringency of 
pollution regulations at conventional significance levels (and to a lesser extent tax effort 
influences pollution regulations), and we reject the null of no cross-policy strategic behavior in 
the determination of environmental stringency at the p < 0.10 level in all three weighting 
schemes.  Besides their statistical significance, these estimates are also economically significant:  
in the Equal weights model a 10% increase in neighbors’ spending levels is associated with a 
12.3% decrease in own relative abatement expenditures.  In the two-year lag model (Table 3), 
neighboring tax policy has a statistically significant effect on own environmental policy, while in 
the five-year lag model both neighboring tax and spending policy have a statistically significant 
impact on own environmental policy.  The null of no cross-policy effects is rejected at the p < 
0.01 level in all three weighting schemes in both lag models.  While many possible explanations 
exist, these results are consonant with states appealing to firms by conceding lax environmental 
standards as a reaction to neighboring states enhancing their public good provision and tax relief.   
  Moving to the tax effort specifications, we find sporadic evidence in favor of the multi-
dimensional approach.  The contemporaneous models reveal no inter-policy results, but there is 
evidence that a statistically significant interaction exists between neighboring governmental 
expenditures and own tax rates in the two-year lag models.  Under two of the three weighting 
schemes, the coefficient estimate is significant at the p < 0.01 level (p < 0.10 in the third model), 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
89.69) for the three first-stage equations using income (population) weights; Shea’s (1997) partial R
2s are 0.01, 0.06, 
and 0.05 (0.04, 0.18, and 0.25), respectively.   16
suggesting that increases in state i’s neighbors’ expenditure levels are associated with tax rate 
decreases in state i.  The magnitude of the estimate, however, is small:  a 10% increase in 
neighbors’ expenditure levels induces approximately a 1% tax rate decrease.  In the five-year lag 
model this result is not evident, yet there is a statistically significant relationship between 
neighboring abatement levels and own tax rates at the p < 0.01 level of significance.   
Interestingly, the coefficient estimates do not accord well with the preceding results that are 
largely consistent with a basket of incentive tradeoffs; in this case parameter estimates indicate 
that increases in neighboring environmental stringency are associated with lower tax rates.   
  We also find evidence in favor of cross-policy interactions within the third policy 
instrument, government expenditures.  In this case, there is a weak influence of neighboring 
environmental stringency on own government expenditures, and a strong effect of neighboring 
tax effort.  The null of no contemporaneous cross-policy effects is rejected at the p < 0.10 level 
in all three weighting schemes.  While the contemporaneous relationship between neighboring 
tax effort and own government expenditures is contrary to our conjecture of a basket of incentive 
tradeoffs, the results from the lagged models are in line with this hypothesis, indicating a highly 
significant, negative relationship between neighboring tax effort and own government 
expenditures.  The magnitude of the effect is in the range of a 2.5% decrease in expenditures for 
each 10% increase in neighboring tax effort.  The null of no cross-policy effects is rejected at the 
p < 0.01 level in all six lagged specifications.   
Prior to discussing the own-policy reaction functions, it is worth pointing out that the 
matrix of cross-policy effects is not symmetric.  For example, while neighboring government 
expenditures has a contemporaneous effect on own environmental policy, neighboring 
environmental policy does not have a robust, statistically significant effect on own government   17
expenditures.  Similarly, neighboring tax effort has a contemporaneous influence on own 
spending levels, but neighboring spending does not affect own tax effort.  Likewise, in the two-
year lag models, neighboring tax effort influences own environmental policy, but neighboring 
environmental policy does not impact own tax effort.  The source behind such asymmetries is 
beyond the scope of the current paper, but suggests either a ranking of the importance of policies, 
or may reflect differences in the observability of neighboring policies.  For example, neighboring 
tax effort has a statistically significant effect in virtually every specification estimated, regardless 
of dependent variable, lag specification, or weighting scheme.  This may reflect the importance 
of tax policy in luring mobile capital, or may reflect the fact that changes in tax effort tend to be 
highly publicized. 
Proceeding to the intra-policy effects, we find that the behavioral patterns found in the 
between-policy interactions spill over quite nicely to the within-policy parameter estimates.   
Considering the contemporaneous specifications in Table 2, we find a fair amount of evidence in 
favor of intra-policy spatial interaction:  neighboring tax and spending rates have a strong, 
positive effect on own tax and spending rates, respectively.  In the tax (spending) specifications 
using the Equal weighting schemes, a 10% increase in neighboring tax effort (spending) 
increases own tax effort (spending) by 9.3% (12.0%).  These results also hold by and large when 
we consider the lagged results in Table 3, although the coefficient magnitudes decrease in value 
over time.  In addition, we also find evidence – consonant with Fredriksson and Millimet 
(2002b) – of within-policy strategic behavior for environmental policy using the two-year lag 
model.  Overall, these results are largely consonant with the growing literature on uni-
dimensional policies.   
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Sensitivity analysis 
  Following Fredriksson and Millimet (2002b), we perform two sets of sensitivity analyses 
to assess the robustness of the results discussed above.
14  First, we consider three additional 
weighting schemes: Equal, Income, and Population weights, except defined over regional, as 
opposed to only contiguous, neighbors.  The eight regional assignments are taken from the 
BEA.
15  In the interest of brevity, empirical results are not presented, but we make them 
available upon request.  We do note that the results suggest a much weaker degree of strategic 
policymaking at the regional level: in general, estimated elasticities, when significant, are 
smaller in absolute value than corresponding estimates reported in Tables 2 and 3. 
  Second, we allow for the fact that states may react asymmetrically to changes in 
neighboring policies.  In particular, states that have been more (less) successful in the recent past 
attracting mobile capital may respond differently to changes in neighboring policies.  Thus, we 
estimate the following revised version of (7) 
Yit = φ 0pIit48 ω ijtYjtp + φ 1p(1-Iit)48 ω ijtYjtp + xitβ  + η it;   i = 1…48; j ≠  i   (7') 
where Iit is an indicator variable, taking a value of one if own FDI exceeds (the weighted average 
of) neighboring foreign direct investment (FDI) and φ 0p and φ 1p are the parameters of interest.
16 
                                                           
14 We also attempted a third set of robustness tests related to our measure of tax policy.  We replaced the measure of 
tax effort with (i) total state corporate tax revenue, (ii) total state tax revenue (from all sources), and (iii) total local 
property tax revenue collected within each state.  These results are contained in Tables 4 – 9.  While use of these 
variables supports the conclusion of own- and cross-policy strategic behavior, many of the TSLS diagnostic tests 
suggest that the results are not overly reliable. 
15 Regional assignments are as follows: (i) New England: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, Connecticut; (ii) Mideast: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland; (iii) Great Lakes: 
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin; (iv) Plains: Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Nebraska, Kansas; (v) Southeast: Georgia, Florida, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana; (vi) Southwest: Oklahoma, Texas, Arizona, New 
Mexico; (vii) Rocky Mountain: Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah; and, (viii) Far West: Washington, 
Oregon, California, Nevada. 
16 We tried two stock measures of FDI: (i) gross value of plant, property, and equipment (PP&E) and (ii) 
employment in foreign-owned affiliates for total manufacturing.  We also used a flow measure of FDI: the number 
of new foreign-owned manufacturing plants.  Finally, we also used lagged values of these measures to define the 
indicator variable.  All specifications yielded qualitatively similar results.   19
Again, in the interest of brevity, empirical estimates are not presented, but a noteworthy result is 
that when comparing φ 0p and φ 1p, we rarely reject the null of equality, and in the few cases where 
the null is rejected, the economic difference between the parameters is minimal.  Consequently, 
it does not appear that states respond differentially based on past success in attracting FDI. 
V.  Concluding Comments 
  Whether, and to what extent, strategic interaction of public policies is prevalent amongst 
governments merits serious consideration.  Since many institutional arrangements in the US are 
designed to either attenuate or eliminate possibilities of horizontal strategic interaction, it is 
important to determine if a considerable amount of strategic interaction exists.  In this paper we 
argue that it is not only the within-policy interaction that should be considered, but also the 
cross-policy reaction functions.  The current literature largely considers strategic interaction in a 
uni-dimensional framework.  Our findings are consistent with the notion that reaction functions 
between policies have a nonzero slope.  For example, we find that states respond to increased 
governmental expenditure levels of neighbors by lowering their own pollution standards.  If 
these cross-policy interactions are ignored, then the overall level of strategic interaction could be 
considerably underestimated.  Our results also confirm the extant literature in that we observe a 
good deal of intra-policy horizontal strategic interaction.  While these results seem to be a step 
forward, we by no means consider this study to be the final word on this topic.  Much scope 
remains for fruitful exploration.   20
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 Table 1. Summary Statistics, 1977 - 1994.
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Abatement 864 1.02 0.37
  (Levinson (2001) index)
Tax Effort 864 96.06 15.93
Government Expenditures 864 7.89E+06 1.05E+07
Population 864 4.94E+06 5.13E+06
Population Density 864 164.19 230.30
Urbanization 864 0.67 0.14
Unemployment Rate 864 0.07 0.02
Per Capita Income 864 1.19E+04 2029.67
% Elderly (> 65 years) 864 0.12 0.02
% Kids (5 - 17 years) 864 0.20 0.02Table 2. Strategic Interaction over Multiple Policy Instruments Across States, 1977 - 1994.
Var./Depdt. Var.
Equal Income Pop. Equal Income Pop. Equal Income Pop.
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
ln(Neighboring 0.05 0.10 1.96 0.66 0.71 0.06 0.79 1.30 0.26
   Abatement) (0.10) (0.25) (0.87) (1.60) (1.60) (0.57) (1.53) (1.76) (1.81)
ln(Neighboring -1.26 -0.83 -2.52 0.93 0.86 0.47 0.98 1.13 0.29
   Tax Effort) (-2.54) (-1.67) (-1.30) (2.61) (2.67) (5.56) (2.20) (2.09) (2.46)
ln(Neighboring -1.23 -1.21 -1.96 0.29 0.38 -0.03 1.20 1.52 0.76
   Government (-3.21) (-3.55) (-1.75) (1.09) (1.29) (-0.38) (3.62) (3.11) (7.77)
   Expenditure)
Population 1.75E-08 1.15E-08 1.24E-07 8.74E-09 9.96E-09 -6.36E-09 3.78E-08 5.44E-08 3.49E-08
(0.71) (0.47) (0.86) (0.66) (0.70) (-1.00) (2.29) (2.29) (4.00)
Population -5.21E-04 5.29E-04 -2.45E-03 8.02E-04 5.19E-04 3.47E-04 1.58E-03 1.18E-03 5.76E-04
   Density (-0.38) (0.39) (-0.71) (1.29) (0.90) (1.11) (2.03) (1.22) (1.34)
% Urban 1.65 2.03 0.18 -1.69 -1.82 -1.00 -1.50 -2.60 -0.89
(1.77) (2.23) (0.08) (-3.04) (-2.78) (-4.70) (-2.16) (-2.38) (-3.05)
Unemployment 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 3.10E-03 -0.01 -0.03 -3.12E-03
   Rate (1.96) (2.11) (-0.15) (-1.05) (-1.12) (1.33) (-1.36) (-1.62) (-0.97)
Per Capita -1.29E-05 5.21E-05 8.90E-04 -2.09E-04 -2.59E-04 -8.08E-05 -2.00E-04 -4.34E-04 -6.60E-05
   Income (-0.04) (0.17) (1.17) (-1.11) (-1.25) (-1.13) (-0.85) (-1.25) (-0.67)
(Per Capita -1.31E-09 -4.95E-09 -8.07E-08 1.25E-08 1.57E-08 4.04E-09 1.37E-08 2.95E-08 3.42E-09
   Income)
2 (-0.05) (-0.21) (-1.17) (0.91) (1.05) (0.74) (0.80) (1.18) (0.45)
(Per Capita 5.16E-14 1.40E-13 2.04E-12 -3.29E-13 -4.02E-13 -1.19E-13 -2.76E-13 -6.58E-13 4.70E-15
   Income)
3 (0.08) (0.24) (1.18) (-0.96) (-1.08) (-0.87) (-0.64) (-1.06) (0.02)
% Elderly 2.54 2.74 -0.97 0.05 -0.07 0.26 -2.03 -2.45 -1.60
(1.42) (1.53) (-0.24) (0.06) (-0.09) (0.58) (-2.23) (-1.90) (-2.57)
% Young 1.64 1.27 0.62 -0.26 -0.5 1.13 -2.21 -3.48 -0.82
(1.12) (0.87) (0.33) (-0.29) (-0.47) (0.30) (-1.96) (-1.96) (-1.96)
State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joint Significance:
   All Neighboring [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.08] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Policies
Joint Significance:
   Neighboring [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.10] [p=0.21] [p=0.26] [p=0.80] [p=0.03] [p=0.10] [p=0.04]
   Cross-Policies
Sargan's χ
2 = 5.29 χ
2 = 3.99 χ
2 = 5.80 χ
2 = 2.71 χ
2 = 0.80 χ
2 = 4.05 χ
2 = 5.44 χ
2 = 1.62 χ
2 = 6.02
   Overidentification [p=0.15] [p=0.26] [p=0.12] [p=0.44] [p=0.85] [p=0.26] [p=0.14] [p=0.66] [p=0.11]
   Test
Hall et al. (1996) Test ρ  = 0.43 ρ  = 0.43 ρ  = 0.43 ρ  = 0.41 ρ  = 0.42 ρ  = 0.40 ρ  = 0.41 ρ  = 0.42 ρ  = 0.40
   for Instrument  [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Relevance
Staiger-Stock (1997) Bmax=0.03 Bmax=0.03 Bmax=0.03 Bmax=0.03 Bmax=0.03 Bmax=0.03 Bmax=0.03 Bmax=0.03 Bmax=0.03
   Measure of Maximum
   Relative Bias
Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ
2 = 38.48 χ
2 = 45.84 χ
2 = 36.19 χ
2 = 9.72 χ
2 = 13.42 χ
2 = 0.87 χ
2 = 63.14 χ
2 = 78.08 χ
2 = 56.62
   Test for Exogeneity [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.02] [p=0.00] [p=0.83] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864 864 864 864
NOTES: All regressions estimated via IV-FE. Instrument set includes the weighted average of neighboring values for: population, population density, 
% urban, % elderly, and % young.  In addition, neighboring per capita income is used as an instrument in the abatement equations; neighboring 
unemployment as an instrument in the tax and expenditure equations. T-statistics in parentheses.
ln(Own Abatement) ln(Own Tax Effort) ln(Own Gov't Expenditure)Table 3. Strategic Interaction over Multiple Policy Instruments with a Lag: Selected Coefficients.
Var./Depdt. Var.
Equal Income Pop. Equal Income Pop. Equal Income Pop.
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
Two-Year Lag:
ln(Neighboring 0.17 0.17 0.22 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03
   Abatement) (2.15) (2.15) (2.48) (-0.27) (-0.45) (0.65) (1.20) (1.21) (1.41)
ln(Neighboring -0.84 -0.84 -0.61 0.34 0.34 0.37 -0.16 -0.18 -0.25
   Tax Effort) (-3.82) (-3.98) (-3.64) (6.05) (6.18) (8.61) (-2.54) (-3.05) (-5.36)
ln(Neighboring 0.06 0.01 0.13 -0.14 -0.13 -0.07 0.26 0.25 0.18
   Government (0.30) (0.05) (0.80) (-2.74) (2.89) (-1.71) (4.74) (5.08) (3.94)
   Expenditure)
Joint Significance:
   All Neighboring [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Policies
Joint Significance:
   Neighboring [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.02] [p=0.00] [p=0.19] [p=0.02] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Cross-Policies
Five-Year Lag:
ln(Neighboring -0.05 -0.07 -0.24 -0.11 -0.11 -0.07 -4.32E-03 -3.15E-03 0.01
   Abatement) (-0.59) (-0.72) (-2.29) (-5.32) (-5.19) (-2.93) (-0.19) (-0.14) (0.35)
ln(Neighboring -1.07 -0.95 -0.95 0.14 0.14 0.19 -0.23 -0.24 -0.26
   Tax Effort) (-4.30) (-4.03) (-4.68) (2.51) (2.51) (4.00) (-3.61) (-3.98) (-5.02)
ln(Neighboring -0.54 -0.39 -0.41 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.12 0.10 0.04
   Government (-2.21) (-1.79) (-1.92) (-0.41) (-0.57) (-0.21) (1.92) (1.87) (0.67)
   Expenditure)
Joint Significance:
   All Neighboring [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Policies
Joint Significance:
   Neighboring [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.01] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Cross-Policies
NOTES: All regressions estimated via OLS-FE, and include the same controls as in Table 2. Number of observations is 768 in the two-year lag
specifications, 624 in the five-year specifications. T-statistics in parentheses.
ln(Own Abatement) ln(Own Tax Effort) ln(Own Gov't Expenditure)Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis I: State Corporate Tax Receipts. 
Var./Depdt. Var.
Equal Income Pop. Equal Income Pop. Equal Income Pop.
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
ln(Neighboring 1.08 0.24 -0.32 0.33 -0.60 -0.28 -0.44 -0.59 0.22
   Abatement) (1.72) (0.38) (-0.19) (0.59) (-0.73) (-0.63) (-2.38) (-1.63) (1.47)
ln(Neighboring 0.71 -0.01 0.37 -0.67 0.65 0.90 0.30 0.66 -0.28
   Taxes) (1.01) (-0.01) -0.29 (-1.08) (0.71) (1.74) (1.49) (1.59) (-1.77)
ln(Neighboring -1.03 -0.96 -0.95 -0.35 -1.68 -1.49 0.22 -0.26 0.88
   Government (-2.01) (-1.82) (-0.72) (-0.54) (-1.49) (-2.85) (0.91) (0.55) (5.39)
   Expenditure)
State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joint Significance:
   All Neighboring [p=0.01] [p=0.00] [p=0.02] [p=0.02] [p=0.07] [p=0.02] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Policies
Joint Significance:
   Neighboring [p=0.10] [p=0.01] [p=0.06] [p=0.40] [p=0.21] [p=0.02] [p=0.06] [p=0.24] [p=0.17]
   Cross-Policies
Sargan's χ
2 = 8.63 χ
2 = 6.72 χ
2 = 14.34 χ
2 = 11.75 χ
2 = 8.55 χ
2 = 3.12 χ
2 = 14.94 χ
2 = 9.10 χ
2 = 8.55
   Overidentification [p=0.03] [p=0.08] [p=0.00] [p=0.01] [p=0.04] [p=0.37] [p=0.00] [p=0.03] [p=0.04]
   Test
Hall et al. (1996) Test ρ  = 0.34 ρ  = 0.32 ρ  = 0.21 ρ  = 0.32 ρ  = 0.31 ρ  = 0.17 ρ  = 0.32 ρ  = 0.31 ρ  = 0.17
   for Instrument  [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Relevance
Staiger-Stock (1997) Bmax=0.05 Bmax=0.05 Bmax=0.12 Bmax=0.05 Bmax=0.05 Bmax=0.13 Bmax=0.05 Bmax=0.05 Bmax=0.13
   Measure of Maximum
   Relative Bias
Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ
2 = 38.24 χ
2 = 45.84 χ
2 = 27.52 χ
2 = 1.98 χ
2 = 13.42 χ
2 = 6.86 χ
2 = 35.61 χ
2 = 46.11 χ
2 = 59.25
   Test for Exogeneity [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.58] [p=0.00] [p=0.08] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864 864 864 864
NOTES: See Table 2.
ln(Own Abatement) ln(Own Taxes) ln(Own Gov't Expenditure)Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis I: State Corporate Tax Receipts. 
Var./Depdt. Var.
Equal Income Pop. Equal Income Pop. Equal Income Pop.
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
Two-Year Lag:
ln(Neighboring 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.12 0.13 -0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05
   Abatement) (2.49) (2.47) (2.98) (1.38) (1.44) (-0.40) (1.38) (1.42) (2.11)
ln(Neighboring 0.11 0.09 0.05 -0.36 -0.33 -0.25 0.00 -2.90E-04 0.01
   Taxes) (1.29) (1.02) (0.62) (-3.51) (-3.27) (-2.66) (0.06) (-0.01) (0.43)
ln(Neighboring 0.29 0.22 0.28 -0.84 -0.68 -0.81 0.31 0.31 0.25
   Government (1.53) (1.22) (1.67) (-3.90) (-3.29) (-4.15) (5.99) (6.29) (5.27)
   Expenditure)
Joint Significance:
   All Neighboring [p=0.01] [p=0.02] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Policies
Joint Significance:
   Neighboring [p=0.06] [p=0.15] [p=0.12] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.38] [p=0.36] [p=0.10]
   Cross-Policies
Five-Year Lag:
ln(Neighboring -0.05 -0.07 -0.20 0.22 0.24 0.09 1.35E-03 1.02E-03 0.02
   Abatement) (-0.53) (-0.70) (-1.88) (2.17) (2.38) (0.78) (0.06) (0.04) (0.58)
ln(Neighboring -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.09 0.09 0.10
   Tax Effort) (-0.21) (-0.13) (-0.14) (-0.64) (-0.45) (-0.54) (3.57) (3.65) (4.37)
ln(Neighboring -0.02 8.76E-04 0.02 -0.95 -0.88 -1.08 0.11 0.09 0.04
   Government (-0.09) (3.73E-03) (0.10) (-3.44) (-3.36) (-4.42) (1.82) (1.55) (0.73)
   Expenditure)
Joint Significance:
   All Neighboring [p=0.95] [p=0.92] [p=0.31] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Policies
Joint Significance:
   Neighboring [p=0.96] [p=0.99] [p=0.99] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.01] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Cross-Policies
NOTES: See Table 3.
ln(Own Abatement) ln(Own Taxes) ln(Own Gov't Expenditure)Table 6. Sensitivity Analysis II: State Total Tax Receipts. 
Var./Depdt. Var.
Equal Income Pop. Equal Income Pop. Equal Income Pop.
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
ln(Neighboring 2.41 1.70 -0.25 -0.70 -0.34 0.38 -0.26 -0.03 0.24
   Abatement) (2.26) (1.77) (-0.32) (-3.65) (-1.64) (1.28) (-2.05) (-0.17) (1.34)
ln(Neighboring 4.66 3.97 1.15 0.88 -0.04 -2.93 -0.08 -0.42 -1.31
   Taxes) (2.08) (1.82) (0.98) (1.45) (-0.07) (-1.96) (-0.21) (-0.90) (-1.48)
ln(Neighboring -4.33 -3.84 -1.65 -0.57 0.43 3.11 0.62 1.02 1.78
   Government (-2,36) (-2.35) (-1.46) (-0.92) (0.71) (2.36) (1.50) (2.08) (2.28)
   Expenditure)
State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joint Significance:
   All Neighboring [p=0.02] [p=0.00] [p=0.01] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Policies
Joint Significance:
   Neighboring [p=0.05] [p=0.01] [p=0.04] [p=0.00] [p=0.01] [p=0.06] [p=0.08] [p=0.42] [p=0.28]
   Cross-Policies
Sargan's χ
2 = 0.59 χ
2 = 0.63 χ
2 = 13.59 χ
2 = 21.62 χ
2 = 53.50 χ
2 = 7.60 χ
2 = 24.90 χ
2 = 30.95 χ
2 = 7.33
   Overidentification [p=0.90] [p=0.89] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.06] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.06]
   Test
Hall et al. (1996) Test ρ  = 0.37 ρ  = 0.38 ρ  = 0.37 ρ  = 0.43 ρ  = 0.43 ρ  = 0.45 ρ  = 0.43 ρ  = 0.43 ρ  = 0.45
   for Instrument  [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Relevance
Staiger-Stock (1997) Bmax=0.04 Bmax=0.04 Bmax=0.04 Bmax=0.03 Bmax=0.03 Bmax=0.03 Bmax=0.03 Bmax=0.03 Bmax=0.03
   Measure of Maximum
   Relative Bias
Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ
2 = 47.00 χ
2 = 50.23 χ
2 = 26.96 χ
2 = 34.64 χ
2 = 24.49 χ
2 = 50.14 χ
2 = 30.02 χ
2 = 35.46 χ
2 = 56.75
   Test for Exogeneity [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864 864 864 864
NOTES: See Table 2.
ln(Own Abatement) ln(Own Taxes) ln(Own Gov't Expenditure)Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis II: State Total Tax Receipts. 
Var./Depdt. Var.
Equal Income Pop. Equal Income Pop. Equal Income Pop.
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
Two-Year Lag:
ln(Neighboring 0.20 0.20 0.26 3.83E-03 4.80E-03 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05
   Abatement) (2.55) (2.58) (3.00) (0.14) (0.17) (-0.41) (1.49) (1.55) (2.13)
ln(Neighboring 0.48 0.48 0.26 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 0.11 0.10 0.08
   Taxes) (1.78) (1.86) (1.05) (-1.22) (-1.34) (-1.26) (1.41) (1.41) (1.17)
ln(Neighboring -0.04 -0.13 0.09 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.23 0.22 0.19
   Government (-0.16) (-0.49) (1.35) (1.85) (2.29) (1.96) (2.78) (2.90) (2.51)
   Expenditure)
Joint Significance:
   All Neighboring [p=0.00] [p=0.01] [p=0.00] [p=0.30] [p=0.11] [p=0.25] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Policies
Joint Significance:
   Neighboring [p=0.03] [p=0.05] [p=0.08] [p=0.17] [p=0.07] [p=0.14] [p=0.14] [p=0.13] [p=0.06]
   Cross-Policies
Five-Year Lag:
ln(Neighboring -0.03 -0.05 -0.20 0.01 0.02 0.04 4.53E-04 3.99E-04 0.02
   Abatement) (-0.37) (-0.52) (-1.86) (0.29) (0.59) (1.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.76)
ln(Neighboring 0.65 0.64 0.47 9.41E-04 -0.04 0.03 0.17 0.12 0.09
   Taxes) (2.15) (2.22) (1.75) (0.01) (-0.38) (0.36) (2.26) (1.72) (1.29)
ln(Neighboring -0.59 -0.56 -0.39 0.17 0.22 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.07
   Government (-1.78) (-1.76) (-1.30) (1.52) (2.12) (0.40) (0.92) (1.16) (0.97)
   Expenditure)
Joint Significance:
   All Neighboring [p=0.18] [p=0.14] [p=0.09] [p=0.13] [p=0.03] [p=0.50] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.01]
   Policies
Joint Significance:
   Neighboring [p=0.10] [p=0.09] [p=0.22] [p=0.29] [p=0.08] [p=0.51] [p=0.08] [p=0.00] [p=0.33]
   Cross-Policies
NOTES: See Table 3.
ln(Own Abatement) ln(Own Taxes) ln(Own Gov't Expenditure)Table 8. Sensitivity Analysis III: Total Local Property Tax Receipts. 
Var./Depdt. Var.
Equal Income Pop. Equal Income Pop. Equal Income Pop.
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
ln(Neighboring 1.89 -1.32 -1.51 -0.32 -0.23 -1.28 -0.33 -0.29 0.42
   Abatement) (1.90) (-0.64) (-1.83) (-1.50) (-0.97) (-2.42) (-2.16) (-1.65) (1.73)
ln(Neighboring -2.24 2.27 0.96 0.35 0.37 -0.47 -0.10 -0.28 0.28
   Taxes) (-1.63) (0.80) (1.94) (1.65) (1.61 (-1.27) (-0.70) (-1.65) (1.65)
ln(Neighboring 2.25 -3.79 -1.36 0.31 0.48 1.41 0.62 0.74 0.35
   Government (1.23) (-1.07) (-2.67) (1.48) (2.64) (3.33) (4.16) (5.48) (1.81)
   Expenditure)
State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joint Significance:
   All Neighboring [p=0.04] [p=0.07] [p=0.02] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Policies
Joint Significance:
   Neighboring [p=0.10] [p=0.12] [p=0.03] [p=0.18] [p=0.03] [p=0.00] [p=0.08] [p=0.18] [p=0.21]
   Cross-Policies
Sargan's χ
2 = 2.36 χ
2 = 1.86 χ
2 = 5.28 χ
2 = 23.34 χ
2 = 21.94 χ
2 = 5.51 χ
2 = 22.21 χ
2 = 22.56 χ
2 = 8.84
   Overidentification [p=0.50] [p=0.60] [p=0.15] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.14] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.03]
   Test
Hall et al. (1996) Test ρ  = 0.18 ρ  = 0.19 ρ  = 0.27 ρ  = 0.23 ρ  = 0.23 ρ  = 0.30 ρ  = 0.23 ρ  = 0.23 ρ  = 0.30
   for Instrument  [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Relevance
Staiger-Stock (1997) Bmax=0.16 Bmax=0.14 Bmax=0.08 Bmax=0.09 Bmax=0.09 Bmax=0.06 Bmax=0.09 Bmax=0.09 Bmax=0.06
   Measure of Maximum
   Relative Bias
Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ
2 = 41.03 χ
2 = 45.28 χ
2 = 31.93 χ
2 = 19.54 χ
2 = 31.50 χ
2 = 48.35 χ
2 = 33.14 χ
2 = 39.00 χ
2 = 59.55
   Test for Exogeneity [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.83] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864 864 864 864
NOTES: See Table 2.
ln(Own Abatement) ln(Own Taxes) ln(Own Gov't Expenditure)Table 9. Sensitivity Analysis III: Total Local Property Tax Receipts. 
Var./Depdt. Var.
Equal Income Pop. Equal Income Pop. Equal Income Pop.
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
Two-Year Lag:
ln(Neighboring 0.17 0.17 0.25 -0.03 -0.04 3.25E-03 0.03 0.03 0.05
   Abatement) (2.23) (2.23) (2.88) (-0.90) (-1.23) (0.09) (1.24) (1.30) (1.99)
ln(Neighboring -0.21 -0.19 -0.17 0.21 0.23 0.13 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06
   Taxes) (-1.96) (-1.82) (-1.90) (4.68) (5.18) (3.27) (-1.50) (-1.21) (-2.48)
ln(Neighboring 0.41 0.32 0.38 0.36 0.40 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.28
   Government (2.29) (1.92) (2.34) (4.66) (5.61) (4.60) (6.46) (6.79) (6.14)
   Expenditure)
Joint Significance:
   All Neighboring [p=0.00] [p=0.01] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Policies
Joint Significance:
   Neighboring [p=0.02] [p=0.04] [p=0.02] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.12] [p=0.17] [p=0.01]
   Cross-Policies
Five-Year Lag:
ln(Neighboring -0.06 -0.08 -0.21 -0.12 -0.14 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.02
   Abatement) (-0.69) (-0.87) (-1.93) (-3.33) (-3.70) (-1.55) (-0.32) (-0.34) (0.67)
ln(Neighboring -0.29 -0.25 -0.21 -0.10 -0.07 -0.14 -0.07 -0.08 0.09
   Taxes) (-2.25) (-2.03) (-2.03) (-1.92) (-1.40) (-3.38) (-2.32) (-2.45) (-3.44)
ln(Neighboring -0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.52 0.55 0.39 0.21 0.19 0.15
   Government (-0.34) (-0.18) (0.10) (5.91) (6.92) (4.93) (3.92) (3.78) (3.11)
   Expenditure)
Joint Significance:
   All Neighboring [p=0.15] [p=0.20] [p=0.05] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00]
   Policies
Joint Significance:
   Neighboring [p=0.08] [p=0.13] [p=0.13] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.00] [p=0.07] [p=0.05] [p=0.00]
   Cross-Policies
NOTES: See Table 3.
ln(Own Abatement) ln(Own Taxes) ln(Own Gov't Expenditure)